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INTRODUCTION 
The decision by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to send a 
peace-keeping force to separate the warring factions of Goukhouni Weddeye 
and Hissene Habre in Chad in November 1981, marked an important milestone 
in the history of the Pan-African body for a variety of reasons. First, it was seen 
by many observers as paving the way for the fulfilment of Kwame Nkrumah's 
(ex-President of Ghana) dream of an African High Command, which had been 
jettisoned by the founding conference in 1963. Second, and closely related to 
the first, many believed that the Organization was moving away from its 
egalitarian and voluntaristic nature towards some form of supranationalism. 
Third, the decision was interpreted as an attempt by the OAU to arm itself with 
some teeth having been accused in the past of behaving like a "toothless 
bulldog" which could only bark and not bite. The Chad force was thus seen as 
a belated attempt by the Organization to respond effectively to the needs of its 
members with regard to conflict management. Finally, the establishment of the 
peace-keeping force was seen as a solid demonstration of the determination by 
African states to find "African solutions to African problems," to "try Africa 
first,"1 so to speak, and shield the continent from Great Power intervention and 
rivalry. 
In spite of such high hopes and expectations, the OAU peace-keeping 
operation in Chad was a total failure. It not only failed to bring an end to the 
fighting but it also paved the way for the successful overthrow of the "legal" 
authority in Chad.2 With that, the first attempt by the OAU to carve for itself a 
respectable image and something "of a figure in the world," came to an abrupt 
end.3 This article examines the genesis of the peace force, the reasons for its 
failure, and finally, tries to identify the lessons that can be learned from its 
failure. 
THE CHADIAN CONFLICT: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Chad is the fifth largest country in Africa as well as one of the continent's 
poorest It is not only completely landlocked, but much of its territory, 
especially in the north, is located in the Sahel and Sahara Desert. As a result of 
these geographical factors, the northern region was referred to as "useless Chad" 
by the French in contrast to "useful Chad," the southern 10% of the country.4 
Chad was one of the last territories to be colonized by a European power, 
France, on 22 April 1900. "Thus, Chad's colonial borders were drawn more 
hastily than most" others in Africa. In fact, it was not until 1914 that the French 
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successfully pacified the northern region commonly known as BET (Borkou, 
Ennedi and Tibesti). (see map) Besides, although most of the territory became 
independent in 1960 along with other French possessions in Africa, it was not 
until 1965 that France formally handed over the administration of BET to the 
central government at N'Djamena.5 The BET province is populated by pre-
dominantly Muslim Arabs while the south is inhabited by black Africans, the 
majority of whom are Christians and animists. According to 1975 statistics, 
81.4% of the northern population was illiterate compared with 72.5% in the 
south. In general, much of the "benefits of western education were extended 
mostly to the Sara people of the South. Not surprisingly, from 1960 to 1979, 
politics, the civil service and the army were largely dominated by the Sara."6 
Francois Tombalbaye, the country's first President (1960-1975), was a 
Sara. His government placed ill-trained bureaucrats drawn mainly from the 
south in key administrative positions in the north. Their "administrative 
mismanagement and excesses, as well as their insensitivity to local custom and 
grievances led, starting from 1964, to a number of revolts, initially located in the 
central-eastern provinces and extending (after January 1965), to BET in the 
north."7 Thus, in June 1966, the Front de Libération Nationale du Tchad 
(Frolinat), was formed to redress the grievances of the east-central province of 
the country. Predictably, the central government of Tombalbaye was unable to 
contain the revolts and in 1969, he was compelled to call upon France to send 
troops to N'Djamena to shore up his tenuous hold on the country. However, it 
was his decision to "impose the 'yondo' initiation ceremony on all Sara males 
and aspiring civil servants," that led to his overthrow and death in a coup led by 
Colonel Felix Malloum, who later became President on 13 April 1975.8Malloum 
could not, however, restore peace in the country and in 1979, full-scale civil war 
broke out between his troops and the Armed Forces of the North (FAN) led by 
Hissene Habre, his erstwhile Prime Minister. On 10 November 1979, a 
Transitional Government of National Unity (GUNT), was formed with Goukhouni 
Weddeye as interim President, and Habre as his Defence Minister. As both men 
were from the north of the country, 1979 accordingly saw the beginning of 
northern control of Chadian politics and the central government and, by 
implication, the end of Sara dominance in the country.9 
There were broadly two dimensions to the Chadian conflict which were 
also closely intertwined. First, it was a case of internal strife among rival ethnic 
and religious factions. It started in 1965 and initially posed a serious challenge 
and threat only to the integrity of the regime in power in the country. With time, 
however, even the integrity of the Chadian state came under serious threat.10 
The second dimension was the intervention by African and non-African 
states. The African state that directly intervened in Chad was Libya, a member 
of the OAU, which sent troops to the territory to occupy the disputed Aozou strip 
in 1972. In 1980, Libya sent troops to fight side-by-side with the forces of 
Weddeye. The non-African states that intervened both directly and indirectly 
in the conflict were first, the ex-colonial metropolitan power, France, and later 
the United States. 
The conflict brought into bold relief, at least initially, the constitutional 
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limitations of the OAU. Because it was essentially an internal conflict, the OAU 
could not intervene for fear of contravening Article HI of the Charter which 
proscribes interference in the internal affairs of members.11 The conflict did 
come before the Organization in 1977 but it was rather in the form of a complaint 
by the Chadian Head of State, Malloum, against what he described as Libyan 
support for Frolinat, which was then trying to overthrow his regime. The OAU 
on that occasion employed its more widely used technique of conflict management. 
It set up an ad hoc committee of six states12 to mediate in the dispute. Unfortu-
nately, the committee was unable to persuade the combatants to either observe 
a ceasefire, which would have paved the way for a peaceful settlement, or go 
straight to the peace table.13 
Some African states, mainly those which shared common borders with 
Chad, initiated peace moves to end the strife. The most notable of these 
interventions were those made by Nigeria, Chad's most populous and (poten-
tially) most powerful neighbor. The Nigerian mediation efforts produced two 
agreements, known subsequently as the Lagos and Kano Accords after the 
names of the cities where the meetings were held. In pursuance of the two 
Accords, Nigeria also dispatched a peace-keeping force to Chad in 1979. The 
force was unable to ensure an end to hostilities and was forced to withdraw 
suddenly because of serious disagreement between the Chadian President, 
Weddeye, and the authorities in Lagos.14 
The role of the OAU throughout the Nigerian peace initiatives was that 
of a legitimizer,15 throwing its weight behind all the agreements worked out by 
the Nigerian government. It was obvious, however, that Nigeria did not possess 
either the prestige or political, economic and military leverage needed to impose 
peace on the factions in Chad. Thus, by 1980, full-scale civil war broke out once 
again in the country between factions led by the two major actors: Weddeye and 
Habre. 
The special economic summit of the OAU held in Lagos in April 1980 
did consider the issue of setting up an African force in Chad. However, no 
serious attempts were made to work out the modalities of the force although the 
suggestion had the support of GUNT and its President, Weddeye. By July 1980, 
the OAU was compelled to admit failure in setting up the force. It would appear 
at the time that the major constraint was financial, because the African Group 
at the UN hinted at about the same time that it had been mandated to seek 
financial assistance from the world body since the OAU was unable to raise 
enough funds to finance the force.16 To be sure, the OAU did appeal to its 
members for funds individually, but none of them volunteered any assistance. 
Another attempt to find a solution to the Chadian problem occurred in 
December 1980 when an emergency summit convened in Lagos. In all, eleven 
countries attended the meeting including many of Chad's neighbor.17 The final 
communique "urged that no foreign troops be stationed in the territory of Chad 
except an OAU Peace-Keeping force." The summit also observed that any 
interference in the internal affairs of Chad would only serve to undermine the 
peace which had been established in the country by the relative military 
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superiority of the GUNT force with Libyan support.18 The Libyan enforced peace 
lasted until late in 1981 when the troops suddenly withdrew from the country. 
GENESIS OF THE OAU PEACE-KEEPING FORCE 
The idea of sending a buffer force to separate antagonistic factions in a 
state or territory is not entirely new in international politics. It was first 
developed by the UN in 1956 when it sent troops to Suez to separate Egyptian 
and Israeli forces there.19 
Although the OAU Charter does not contain any provision for an 
"obstruction force,"20 it could be argued that raising the force for Chad was 
within its competence and in line with Article 33 of the UN Charter which 
empowers members to take disputes that are likely to endanger international 
peace and security, first "to regional agencies or arrangements." It must be 
stated here also that long before the conflict in Chad broke out, the OAU had 
developed its own modes of conflict resolution, i.e., ad hoc committees, 
conference diplomacy, good offices and "presidential mediation."21 The peace 
force in Chad could therefore be regarded as the last weapon in the Organiza-
tion's conflict resolution and management arsenal. 
The immediate occasion for the eventual decision to raise and send the 
peace force to Chad was external to the Organization. The first and perhaps the 
most important factor was the visit by Weddeye to Libya from 2-6 January 1981, 
not long after the Lagos emergency summit on Chad. On 6 January 1981, Col. 
Muammar Qaddafi and Weddeye announced to a startled world the merger of 
their two countries. Specifically, their joint communique stated that they had 
agreed to "work [together] to achieve full unity between the two countries with 
the authority, arms and resources vested in the hands of the people; and to regard 
any aggression on one country as aggression on the other, bom being prepared 
to fight alongside the other."22 Although Libya has had along history of fruitless 
attempts at merging with neighboring countries in the Maghreb, e.g. Egypt, 
Tunisia, Morocco, many African states, especially those under conservative 
leaderships, viewed the prospects of a successful merger between Tripoli and 
N'Djamena with alarm. They believed —and this view was shared by some 
western countries, particularly France and the US—that it would be the first step 
towards the fulfilment of Qaddafi's long-standing ambition of creating a 
"greater Islamic State" in West and Central Africa. The United States and 
France, especially, believed that some of Libya's African policies were a direct 
threat to friendly regimes in the continent.23 America under the conservative 
Reagan Administration also believed that Qaddafi was nothing but a surrogate 
for the Soviets. He must therefore be resisted and, if possible, humiliated. 
Accordingly, the United States rushed military hardware to Sudan as a precaution 
against what some US officials described as a "clear and present threat" from 
Tripoli. The urgency, it is believed, was occasioned by the perception at the 
Pentagon that Qaddafi ' s next target was President Gaffer Numiery, President of 
Sudan.24 
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France, the erstwhile colonial power of Chad, was equally concerned 
about the development of a Libyan-Chadian axis in North-West and Central 
Africa. French diplomats were accordingly despatched to African capitals to 
canvass support for the idea of a Pan-African peace force to replace the Libyans 
in Chad. The French "promised to pay most of the cost of the Force." Paris 
would also provide logistical support by way of transport and the communica-
tion equipment that would be needed by the force. With such an apparently 
attractive bargain, the way was paved for the Pan-African force—Nigeria was 
to provide 8,000 men, Senegal 2,000, and Ivory Coast 1,500.25 
However, it would be wrong to give the impression that only external 
powers were concerned over the rapprochement between Libya and Chad. The 
anxiety of African states over the continued presence of Libyan troops in Chad 
was apparent at the 18th annual summit held in Nairobi in June 1981. The 
conference decided, not surprisingly, "to bury the past and look into the future." 
It also revived, with some urgency, the idea of sending a peace force to Chad to 
be made up of troops from Benin, the Congo, and Sekou Toure's Guinea. In 
anticipation of the force, members were enjoined not to "engage in acts of 
déstabilisation or sabotage against Chad. Assistance would also be given to 
N'Djamena to rebuild its national army."26 Surprisingly, however, the summit 
did not work out in detail the modalities of how such a force was to be financed; 
nor did it make serious arrangements concerning a ceasefire, transportation, and 
other logistical issues. 
The sudden withdrawal of Libyan forces from Chad in early November 
1981, took many observers by surprise and created some strategic problems for 
the OAU, the GUNT government in Chad, and those extra-African states which 
had been worried by the Libyan presence in the country. First, it created a 
security vacuum in the country since the OAU peace force had not been 
assembled. This was a serious problem as the Chadian army was in a shambles 
and could not be relied upon to defend the GUNT regime. Second, to prevent 
an outbreak of civil war and the possible collapse of the GUNT administration, 
which was backed by the OAU, the Pan-African force had to be raised quickly 
to separate the armies of the GUNT and FAN. This was given added urgency 
since fierce fighting had already broken out between the forces of Habre and 
those of Ahmat Acyl, an ally of Weddeye, on 11 November 1981, in the eastern 
part of the country. 
CREATION OF THE OAU FORCE 
The deteriorating security situation in N'Djamena coupled with the 
"favourable" response of some of the major western powers to meet all or most 
of the cost of the peace force, were some of the factors that eventually led to its 
creation in November 1981. This hypothesis is plausible because it is conceivable 
that without such financial promise or, if the western powers had come out 
openly in opposition to such a force, many of the African countries—which are 
also dependent on them for economic and military assistance — would have 
opposed its creation at the Nairobi summit. 
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When it came time to assemble the force, the total number of troops was 
to be drastically streamlined. Nigeria, which was to provide 8,000, would now 
send only 2,000 men. The remaining five contributing states were to contribute 
600 men each, making a total of 5,000 troops. However, in the end, only three 
countries contributed troops: Nigeria, Senegal and Zaire. Adopting the UN 
tradition, the force was to be under the authority of the Secretary-General who 
in turn appointed the Ethiopian, Gebre Egziaber Dawitt, as his personal 
representative in N'Djamena. Dawitt was also to head a Committee made up of 
representatives from Benin, Congo, Guinea and Kenya to oversee the activities 
of the force. A Nigerian, Major-General Geoffrey Ejiga, was to command the 
force. It would appear from this arrangement that the commander of the force 
would be accountable to the Secretary-General through his representative in 
N'Djamena. Chad was divided into three zones for the purpose of troop 
deployment: north, east and central. Zairean troops were to take the northern 
zone at Faya Largeau; the Nigerian contingent was to man the eastern sector at 
Abeche; while the Senegalese were to take control of the central region at 
Mongo.27 (see map) The main task of the force was to separate the armies of the 
GUNT and FAN which were engaged in the civil war. 
On 14 November 1981, the OAU and Weddeye signed a formal 
agreement in Paris establishing the force. The venue for the agreement was 
much more than symbolic. It was proof that the main driving force behind the 
formation of the force was France and its western allies. This fact was resented 
by some OAU members who were worried about the negative psychological 
impact which the "French connection" or "western factor" could have on Pan-
African unity and the effectiveness of the force. The Vice- President of Nigeria, 
Alex Ekwueme, remarked that by signing the agreement in Paris, "the OAU sold 
itself cheaply to France and degraded the true meaning of African Unity."28 It 
was also believed that apart from financial constraints, Sekou Toure's Guinea 
refused to take part in the peace force because of the French role in its creation. 
Whatever the reasons for signing the agreement in Paris may have been, 
one thing that was obviously clear is that many African states felt sufficiently 
concerned and embarrassed to convince the OAU Chairman, Arap Moi of 
Kenya, to get Weddeye and the Organization to sign another agreement in 
Nairobi on 28 November 1981. The agreement covered various aspects of the 
force including its mandate, which was to keep the peace in Chad; supervise 
elections that were to be fixed at a date agreed upon by all factions in the country; 
and, assist in the integration of the Chadian army.29 
THE FORCE IN CHAD — PROBLEMS 
For analytical clarity and ease, these problems can be grouped into three 
inter-related categories: (i) theoretical, that is, those which are related to the 
whole concept of peace-keeping in an African environment and by an African 
Organization; (ii) institutional problems related to the OAU itself as an inter-
national organization; and, (iii) technical problems. 
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Theoretical Problems 
The theoretical arguments that informed the creation of the OAU force 
were faulty. The OAU had patterned its force along the lines of those of the 
United Nations; that is, it was to act as a buffer or an "obstruction force," to 
separate two rival factions. However, the concept of an "obstruction force" also 
assumes that the entities to be separated, be they factions or states, are more or 
less clearly demarcated and identifiable. Furthermore, it is also assumed that 
"while relatively small, it may serve as something of a barrier to the outbreak of 
violence."30 The expectation is that its presence in the disputed territory and/or 
state alone would be enough to pave the way for either political reconciliation 
or, at least, to keep the warring factions separated. It is also assumed that the 
mere presence of the force signifies the peaceful intentions of the disputants to 
give peace a try. 
It is doubtful, however, if these conditions were adequately met in the 
case of Chad. It cannot be said for sure that Habre, one of the key actors in the 
conflict, had any intention of settling the problem peacefully. Besides, he did 
not participate in putting the force together. Finally, it did not command the 
authority and prestige of the UN among its own members. It was wrong for the 
Organization, then, to have patterned its force along the lines of UN forces. 
Institutional Problems 
By far the most potent of all the problems that confronted the force are 
those that fall within the rubric of institutional factors. First, is the absence of 
a provision in the OAU Charter for a peace-keeping force. The founding 
conference had totally rejected Nkrumah's call for an African High Command 
which could have paved the way for a force such as the one that was sent to Chad. 
Although Article XX of the Charter made reference to a Defence Commission 
which meets occasionally, it has not been able to work out the modalities of 
either the African High Command, or a peace-keeping force.31 
A second institutional problem relates to the newness of the venture 
itself. The OAU had never before embarked upon any peace-keeping activity. 
The lack of experience was evident in the way the Organization treated the 
factions in the conflict. For instance, the OAU Standing Committee on Chad met 
in Nairobi, Kenya, in early February 1982 ostensibly to arrange for a ceasefire 
in the territory without the representative of the GUNT. The resolution passed 
at the close of the meeting simply called on all the factions in the conflict to 
observe a ceasefire and open negotiations aimed at national reconciliation by the 
28th of the month.32 
The resolution had several implications for the success and even the 
future of the force in Chad. First, it was the beginning of a process which 
eventually saw the de facto withdrawal of OAU recognition from the GUNT. 
Second, by asking all factions to come to the peace table, it was apparent that 
Weddeye, who until that time was the interim President of Chad, was regarded 
as just the head of a faction in the conflict. By the same token, Habre was 
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recognized as a major force in the Chad political game. Third, it was a tacit 
acknowledgement by the OAU that it was losing hope of ever finding a lasting 
peaceful solution to the conflict. 
Another result of the lack of experience was the failure by the OAU to 
arrange a ceasefire in the territory before the deployment of the force. The entry 
of the force was delayed by several weeks, in part, because of fierce fighting 
between the forces of the GUNT and Habre. This compared poorly with UN 
experience. For instance, it took the UN only two weeks to raise and deploy its 
force in Suez in 1956. 
Aside from the delay and inability to arrange a ceasefire, the mandate of 
the African force was ambiguous. These issues shall be explored in detail below. 
Suffice it to say here, that the different interpretations of its mandate by Habre 
and Weddeye, in particular, added greatly to the problems of the force. 
A third institutional issue deals with the OAU's apparent lack of political 
leverage. The Organization scored very low on this. Obviously some of its 
members, especially Egypt and Sudan, did not believe that they should be bound 
by either its resolutions or identify with its peace-keeping efforts in Chad which 
they were busy undermining. Khartoum not only acted as a conduit for external 
assistance to Habre, but it also provided rear bases for his Armed Forces of the 
North. This support was largely responsible for his triumphant entry into 
N'Djamena in June 1982, even while OAU peace-keepers were still in the 
country. 
The fourth and perhaps the most potent institutional factor relates to the 
funding of the peace force. Although the OAU is numerically the largest 
regional institution in the world, it is also the poorest. Its budget in the three years 
1986-1988, has been $25M, $23.5M and $23.2M respectively." The OAU is not 
only irregularly funded, it is perhaps also the most under-funded organization 
of its type in the world.34 Not surprisingly, it could not finance the force it had 
put together in Chad, estimated to cost between $150 - $300M annually.35 But 
this is to be expected. After all, Africa has the majority of countries designated 
by the United Nations and the World Bank as the least (economically) developed 
in the world. The continent is also heavily indebted. By 1989, total African debt 
was over $230 billion.36 In February 1983, less than four months after the force's 
deployment in Chad, the OAU admitted its inability to fund it when it appealed 
to the UN Security Council to come to its aid. However, such a move would have 
been unconstitutional as the world body has never taken over the funding of a 
peace force not under its control. Not to dash the hopes of the Africans entirely, 
the security council set up a special fund for the force based on voluntary 
contributions, to raise $35M.37 
The effect of the financial squeeze on the activities of the force was 
immediate. First of all, Guinea and Togo, which were to contribute troops, could 
not do so partly because of lack of funds.38 Second, and more important, once 
the contributing states were sure that the OAU was not in a position to fund the 
force, their attitude as well as commitment to the peace-keeping exercise 
changed. Significantly, Nigeria, potentially the most powerful and wealthiest 
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of the contributing states, was also the first to start withdrawing its troops in May 
1982, a month before the OAU deadline of 30 June 1982.39 
It is clear from all UN peace-keeping activities in the past and most 
recently in Namibia, that the availability of liquid cash is an important input in 
the peace-keeping process.40 For the OAU to be able to successfully undertake 
a peace-keeping mission in the future, it must be able to raise funds for the 
operation locally, that is, among its members. It should also be possible for states 
external to the OAU to contribute if they so desire, on a voluntary basis. Such 
monies should be paid directly into the accounts of the force and should be 
centrally administered. This would minimize external manipulation of, and 
interference in the operations of the force. 
It is, however, doubtful if the OAU would be in a position now or in the 
near future to raise an amount which would be four or five times its own annual 
budget. This is particularly pertinent given the continent's very poor economic 
status at the moment. Predictions for the future are equally bleak. Many of the 
members are implementing either IMF imposed or induced varieties of Struc-
tural Adjustment Programmes in a bid to revive their economic fortunes.41 It is 
doubtful, then, if these countries would, in the near future, be willing to give out 
funds by way of increased annual subventions or a special levy for an OAU 
peace force. 
There are two possible implications arising from this conclusion. First, 
it would not be feasible politically for the OAU to raise funds in the near future 
through an increase in membership dues and/or levies. Indeed, members would 
lag more and more behind in the payment of their annual subscriptions as the 
economic recession bites deeper into their economic lives.42 Second, it is pos-
sible that African states would strive hard to avoid situations that would lead to 
military confrontations and/or civil strife, which could threaten the integrity of 
either their regimes or states. The attempt by the authorities in Rwanda to solve 
the country's ethnic problem by bringing into the government the representa-
tives of the majority Hutus in late 1988 is perhaps a pointer to the future in that 
regard.43 
Another issue that has to be seriously addressed in the future relates to 
the human resources at the disposal of the Organization. This would be 
considered at two levels: the resources of the secretariat; and the actual troops 
needed to send to the problem territory. 
The OAU is currently thinly staffed with men and women who are highly 
skilled in military/political matters. This could in part be blamed on the 
recruitment procedure in the Organization, which is based to a large extent on 
national quotas. African states are reluctant to release highly skilled men and 
women to the OAU because of the shortage of such people at home and the need 
to retain the few that are available. Consequently, some appointees may not 
necessarily be the most skilled and competent to fill available vacancies. 
Besides, the salaries paid to OAU staff are still relatively low, although some 
efforts have been made to close the gap when compared with the salaries of staff 
of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), its neighbor.44 There is there-
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fore need for a recruitment procedure which is patterned on that of the UN. 
People should be recruited bearing in mind the "necessity of securing the highest 
standards of efficiency, competence and integrity."45 
The second segment of the resources problem concerns the willingness 
of members to contribute troops towards an OAU peace-keeping assignment in 
future. It is now doubtful that they will be prepared to contribute troops again 
for such an operation. Even when they are favorably disposed, there would still 
be the important issue of the acceptability of such troops to the host country. To 
avoid embarrassing situations such as the public refusal of Togo's troops by 
Weddeye, there should be prior consultations between the host, the OAU and 
donor states before the composition of the force is made public. 
Side by side with the above problems is the issue of logistics. There is 
a conspicuous poverty of logistical facilities in African armies, especially those 
South of the Sahara. Such equipment as transport planes, personnel carriers and 
telecommunications equipment are either in short supply or, in the majority of 
cases, non-existent.46 It is significant to note that the troops of Zaire and Senegal 
were transported to N'Djamena in French transport planes. Even Nigeria, the 
so-called "giant of Africa," made use of western facilities.47 Inadequate logistics 
contributed in no small measure to the eventual failure of the force. As Lt. Col. 
Kupolati of Nigeria, a member of the force, lamented: "the inability or failure 
of the OAU to provide logistic support to the peace-keeping force affected 
command and control of the operation and its efficiency and effectiveness."48 Not 
only did the force arrive late in Chad, its deployment was also held-up by 
logistical problems. The Zairean contingent, for instance, spent about five 
weeks in N'Djamena waiting to be transported to its designated zone.49 
It is doubtful that the OAU and its members could domestically solve the 
logistics problem in any future peace-keeping role. This is because in periods 
of recession and economic uncertainty states tend to cut down on expenditure 
in many areas and military spending is not an exception.50 What is certain, then, 
is that contributing states would in future continue to rely on their external 
friends for logistical support. Such a move should, however, be discouraged for 
reasons which have already been advanced. If there is to be any recourse to the 
use of external facilities, then the OAU should arrange for them as a corporate 
organization to avoid undue interference with the work of the force. 
It is obvious from the experience in Chad that the OAU also lacked 
adequate telecommunications facilities to monitor the force from the Secretariat 
in Addis Ababa, although N'Djamena is relatively close. As Kupolati again 
lamented, "for long periods the secretariat had no clue about what was happening 
in Chad, and the sort of direction and guidance one expected from Addis Ababa, 
never came."51 The inability of the OAU to link-up with Chad is not surprising. 
Telecommunications linkages within and between African capitals are notori-
ously poor, due in part to the many years of neglect during colonial rule, and to 
the policies of the successor regimes. The colonial powers created vertical 
communications lines that ran from the colonial capitals to the métropole. 
Unfortunately, these links have remained basically the same since independence. 
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It is easier to speak to a friend in London from Lagos, than it is to talk to a relative 
in Cotonou, Benin Republic, which is just a few kilometres away. The OAU 
must improve on this lapse in future if its peace-keeping efforts are to be credible 
and effective. 
Much would also depend on the host state. If it already has advanced 
communications facilities, then all that would be required is for the OAU to 
complement such facilities to enable it to link-up directly with the force. In a 
situation like the one in Chad where the existing facilities were either very bad 
or non-existent, there was not much that the OAU could have done. In short, 
while there is certainly a need for better communications channels in future 
between the Secretariat and the force, there is no easy way of providing such 
facilities. 
Technical Problems 
The technical problems could be divided into four broad categories: the 
mandate; the ceasefire; the deployment of the force; and, the command struc-
ture. The mandate of the force, as has already been noted, was ambiguous and 
therefore open to misinterpretation by each of the warring factions in Chad. In 
particular, because the OAU had given the impression that Weddeye was the 
only recognized, de facto President of Chad, he believed that the force was in the 
country to fight to protect the integrity of both his regime and the state. As it 
turned out, such a notion was misplaced. 
Even before the force was sent to Chad, the Secretary-General's rep-
resentative, Gebre Dawitt, made it clear that it would not be a fighting force. The 
OAU, he said, would not repeat the experience of the UN force in the Congo 
(Zaire), which "had collaborated with a government to crush a rebellion."52 The 
statement thus gave indirect assurance to Habre, whose forces were poised along 
the Chad/Sudan border, that he would not be stopped should he make a bid for 
power in N'Djamena. This led a disappointed Weddeye to describe the force as 
"ineffective," adding that "it remained idle while the civil war was escalated."53 
It is clear, then, that the issue of the mandate for any future peace-keeping force 
would have to be carefully examined to avoid a repeat of the Chad fiasco. 
The other problem that has direct relevance to the future was the inability 
of the OAU to arrange a ceasefire in the territory before sending in the troops. 
This was a costly mistake because it not only delayed the deployment of the 
troops, it also allowed Habre to exploit the situation by mobilizing his forces. 
Thus, as late as 11 November 1981, there was still bitter fighting between his 
forces and those of the GUNT. 
To be fair to the OAU, it did make some effort to arrange a ceasefire; but 
it lacked the necessary authority to make them credible and enforceable. For 
instance, on 11 February 1982, almost three months after the troops had been 
sent to N'Djamena, the OAU Standing Committee on Chad met in Nairobi and 
issued a communique mat called on both sides to observe a ceasefire which was 
to come into force on the 28th ofthat month. The disputants were also given up 
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to 15 March to enter into peace negotiations aimed at ending the war, to be 
coordinated and supervised by the Committee. Finally, they were given up to 
April 1982, to draft a national constitution and hold elections to elect a new 
government.54 
In trying to enforce a ceasefire in the territory, the Committee created 
problems which were to undermine its own authority. It seemed to have 
unwittingly placed both Weddeye, the interim President, and Habre, the rebel 
Defence Minister, on the same political pedestal. Most surprisingly, the 
Chadian government was not even represented at the meeting. Accordingly, 
Weddeye described its decisions as "null and void," adding that the meeting was 
itself "illegal."55 Much more important for the peace process was the criticism 
levied against the Committee for "denying the existence of the N'Djamena 
administration as a legitimate government and bringing the whole Chadian 
problem back to one of factions."56 By 15 March 1982, two weeks after the 
Nairobi meeting, fierce fighting had broken out between Habre's FAN and 
Weddeye's GUNT forces resulting in the fall of Oum Hadjer to the forces of 
Habre. (see map) 
Another technical problem is related to the long delay in sending the 
force to N'Djamena. Although the OAU had at its 18th summit in June 1981 
approved the creation of the peace force in Chad, up to November that year it had 
not been sent to N'Djamena. The first contingent of troops, Zaireans, arrived on 
14 November, but until the end ofthat month the rest of the peace-keepers had 
not yet arrived. The delay was not only costly in terms of the effectiveness of 
the force, it also provided an added strategic advantage to Habre. The Algerian 
daily, the Moudjadid put it piercingly: 
the delay profits FAN in direct proportion to the damage it does 
to GUNT, a formation set up by the OAU and which logic 
demands the OAU should support. The delay is not only not in 
the interest of Chad but hardly reinforces the authority of the 
OAU as a Pan-African Organisation.57 
Finally, the command structure was also problematic. In theory, this had 
been taken care of by the appointment of the Nigerian Major-General Geoffrey 
Ejiga, as force commander. However, it did not solve the problem. The main 
reason seemed to have been the inability of the OAU to centrally finance the 
force. Since each state received support from different external sources, they 
were not only susceptible to suggestion and interference from their sponsors, 
they were also reluctant to hand over the control of their troops to the OAU 
commander. For example, Nigeria with the largest contingent in Chad started 
pulling out its forces a month before the OAU deadline.58 
Several important points have come out clearly in the above discussion. 
The first is that to be able to organize an effective ceasefire in a conflict situation 
in future, the Organization must be seen by its members, particularly the parties 
directly involved in the conflict, to be credible and impartial. Its credibility 
would be enhanced if it equips itself with highly skilled civilian and military 
personnel who will be needed to supervise and/or monitor the ceasefire.59 An 
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effective role in this regard would also require substantial financial input from 
the Organization. The amount required would depend not only on the size of the 
territory and number of troops involved, but also the duration of the ceasefire. 
However, given the present economic realities, this writer does not envisage a 
situation in which either a state, a group of states or the entire membership of the 
Organization, could raise huge sums of money for peace-keeping operations.60 
Second, a peace-keeping force should in future be acceptable to all the 
parties in a conflict before it is sent on its mission. Such an arrangement would 
not only make the work of the force easier, it would also make it morally difficult 
for members to undermine its work by giving active encouragement to one of the 
factions in the conflict. 
Third, the mandate of the force is central to its success. It must in all cases 
be clear, precise and unambiguous. The Chad force's mandate, as noted earlier, 
raised a number of issues which could not be resolved by either the OAU or the 
parties to the conflict, especially the host government. One of the unresolved 
issues related to the phrase "contain and temper hostilities " How was this 
to be done? Was the force to fight any challenge to the "legal" authority in Chad? 
Or was it simply to sit and wait? As far as Weddeye was concerned, to "contain 
and temper hostilities" meant that the force would fight on his side against the 
forces of Habre. This was implicit in the phrase, to "safeguard the security of 
the Chad state" and government which were under threat from FAN. Surely, if 
the OAU had made it categorically clear from the onset that the force would not 
impose a government on the Chadian people — that it would only fight in self-
defence — much of the bitterness and misunderstanding would have been 
avoided. 
Fourth, there must be broad agreement among OAU members on the 
need to send such a force to a strife torn territory. The records of the debate 
preceding the establishment of the force are not available, but it is doubtful, for 
instance, if Sudan supported its creation. Whatever the case may be, the hope 
was that Sudan would suspend its support for Habre once the force had been 
assembled and on the ground in N'Djamena. Such a posture would have denied 
Habre any rear bases and sanctuaries. It would have also been difficult, if not 
impossible, for him to regroup his men to launch a successful counter-attack on 
the GUNT's troops without Sudan's connivance. 
Finally, all OAU peace-keeping operations in the future should be under 
one command structure, like their UN counterparts. This would not only 
enhance discipline but also its effectiveness. It would surely minimize the 
tendency for external interference in its activities. It would also eliminate the 
temptation for troop contributing states to dictate to the local commanders 
orders which may be at variance with those of the central command. These are 
some of the technical issues which must be adequately addressed if a future OAU 
peace-keeping force is to avoid the mistakes made in Chad. 
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LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The OAU force in Chad did not achieve the objective of separating the 
warring factions in the territory which would have prepared the way for national 
reconciliation. Instead, it acted inadvertently or otherwise as an "accomplice" 
in the restoration to power of Hissene Habre. Are there any lessons which could 
be learned from that experience? There are two broad lessons: the first stems 
from the psychological problems created by the failure; and the second is the 
need for a revision of the OAU Charter. 
The Psychological Impact 
The failure of the force had a psychological impact on both the OAU and 
its members. It was seen as a humiliation for the Pan-African body not only by 
the members but also by observers. The OAU therefore suffered a crushing blow 
to its prestige and credibility. The operation cast serious doubts on the OAU as 
an organization which could play an effective conflict management and reso-
lution role in die continent to ensure peace and stability. In short, if the Chad 
operation provided a test case in terms of the OAU's ability to successfully 
defuse a conflict situation, it was disarmed, and its confidence severely dented. 
The consequences for individual members are many. 
It is now doubtful whether any member state would ever call upon the 
Organization again to mount a peace-keeping operation on its territory. It is 
equally doubtful that members would collectively muster the political will to 
support a peace-keeping operation in the near future. What is much more likely, 
then, is that members would rely on bilateral security arrangements, the type 
which Weddeye initially worked out with the Libyans. 
The major advantage of such bilateral arrangements even if they are with 
non-African countries, is that the host government will know from the start that 
the force from the "friendly" state would be a fighting force. It would not adopt 
a "wait and see" attitude, but would go straight to die task of protecting the host 
regime and/or government, e.g., die Cubans in Angola. Such a force would also 
send unambiguous signals to the opponents of the regime; that any attempt to 
seize power by force of arms would be met with equal, if not greater force. Thus 
the opponent would risk defeat if he opts for a military solution to the conflict. 
Directly and indirecdy, then, the presence of a fighting force could possibly pave 
the way for a political solution to the conflict Such a scenario is most likely in 
a situation whereby other local and foreign powers are not interested in further 
interference in the conflict to counter the initial advantage which the first 
intervention would have given to the host government. 
The conclusion from the above analysis, then, is that the failure of the 
OAU force in Chad is bound to make bilateral and multilateral security 
agreements among African states on the one hand, and between mem and 
external powers on the other, much more attractive in the future, bom as pre-
emptive measures and to contain actual conflicts.61 Conversely, die concept of 
"try Africa first" has been dealt a severe psychological blow, to a large extent. 
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No African regime would in future want to take the sort of risk that Weddeye 
took in Chad. This will of course have serious implications for African security 
and stability in future. It is likely that the propensity of African states to invite 
in external "friends" in times of conflict/crisis would increase.62 It is also 
doubtful whether foreign powers would give the OAU a chance — that is, "try 
Africa first" — in conflict situations involving their proteges. All this would 
seem to point towards increasing political instability and insecurity in the 
continent in future. 
Need For a Revision of the OAU Charter 
The OAU was not designed to play either a collective security or peace-
keeping role. It was simply conceived as a collégial organization which could 
meet from time to time to deliberate on issues of common interest to the 
members. If the OAU is to truly play a peace-keeping role in the future, then 
there is need for such a role to be reflected in an amended charter. There could 
be an additional clause added to Article 2, under purposes, which could read like 
this: "to maintain inter- and intra-African peace and security" or simply, "to 
maintain peace and security in Africa." Such a commitment would have obvious 
legal and strategic military significance. It would for example, give legal 
backing and status to peace-keeping activities in future.63 
It would also be necessary to give more powers to the Secretary-General 
in the revised charter. Such powers should be akin to those of the UN Secretary-
General as contained in Article 99 of die UN Charter. Under this amendment, 
the Secretary-General could bring to the notice of a "serving OAU Chairman or 
any appropriate authority actions which in his view, may threaten the peace and 
security of any African state and/or the continent."64 This is however a very 
sensitive issue in Pan-African diplomacy. It was clear from the founding 
conference that African leaders did not want a competing centre of power and 
influence within the OAU. This was why they deliberately included the epithet 
"administrative," which leaves no one in doubt that the Secretary-General has 
no "executive" powers. For example, Nzo Ekangaki was forced out of office in 
1974 over the Lonrho affair.65 Besides, there is also the possibility of misuse of 
the powers of the Secretary-General. The controversy and political bitterness 
that were provoked in the continent by the admission of the Saraoui Arab 
Democratic Republic (S ADR) by Edem Kodjo in 1982, brought this danger into 
clear focus.66 African leaders would want to continue with the status quo within 
the OAU system. Nonetheless, if the Secretary-General is to have any signifi-
cant input in future peace-keeping activities, then he must be given some room 
for independent action and initiative, which is not provided for in the Charter at 
the moment. 
In making these suggestions, however, we must not lose sight of the fact 
that the African continent is a complex one ideologically, politically and 
culturally. African leaders are, like many of their counterparts elsewhere, 
conservative. Thus, it is not likely that these suggestions and recommendations 
would be implemented in the near future. Indeed, the chances of their 
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implementation would depend on several other factors; such as the commitment 
of African leaders to ensuring the peace and security of the continent; their 
commitment to the whole idea of Pan-African unity; and the extent of the 
psychological damage caused by the Chad peace-keeping experience. This 
would determine whether or not they would opt for another peace-keeping 
operation in future. Another factor is the state of the economies of individual 
states and the continent in general. Predictions and forecasts are bleak in that 
regard. African economies will remain impaired for some time to come. The 
debt burden has shown no sign of decreasing and so far, the structural adjustment 
programmes are not yielding results in terms of putting an end to the economic 
recession.67 As long as such an economic situation continues, it is doubtful that 
the African states would be able to finance a future peace-keeping operation. 
One way out of this predicament is to suggest that the OAU hold annual 
pledging conferences where non-members as well as members could make 
financial pledges towards specific objectives/activities, i.e., to raise a peace-
keeping force. However, experience with such conferences has not been entirely 
satisfactory.68 After all, one could take the extreme position and say that the 
world does not really owe Africa a living. That after over thirty years of 
independence, Africa ought to have come of age. What all this means in effect, 
is that the future of an African peace-keeping force along the lines of that sent 
to Chad in 1981 is very bleak, at least in the short and medium term. What seems 
more likely in future, especially in light of the emergent world order, is a joint 
OAU/UN operation in situations that pose serious threats not only to Africa's 
peace and stability, but also to world peace. Under such circumstances, the OAU 
would most likely provide the troops while the UN would provide funds and 
logistical support. 
Endnotes 
1. S^Z.CeTvenka,TheUnfinishedQuestforUnityQiewYoTk:Ahicana, 1977),andAmadu 
Sesay et al., The OAU After Twenty Years (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984). 
2. According to C.O.C. Amate, in the middle of May 1982, "it was learnt that the Zaire 
contingent of the force had made contact with anti-government troops in the Lake area... 
Before anything could be done about this, the anti-government troops... had moved large 
numbers of their men to occupy towns that were originally under the control pf the OAU 
force." See C.O.C. Amate, Inside the OAU: Pan-Africanism in Practice (London: 
Macmillan, 1986), p. 187. 
3. See Alan James, The Politics of Peace-Keeping (London: Chatto and Windus, 1969), p. 
12. 
4. Gwendolyn Spencer Prater, "Post-colonial Chad: International Aid and Social Devel-
opment," paper presented at the International Conference on Foreign Aid and Development 
in Africa, University of Ife, Nigeria, 29-31 May 1985, p. 1. 
5. Guy Martin, "Security and Conflict Management in Chad," paper presented at the 30th 
Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (London), 28 March -1 April 
1989, p. 2. 
23 
Winter 1991 
6. Ibid., p. 4. 
7. Ibid., p. 6. 
8. Ibid., p. 6. 
9. Ibid., p. 7. 
10. See Orobola Fasehun and Amadu Sesay, "The OAU and Conflict Control," mimeograph, 
Department of International Relations, Ife, 1980, p. 12. 
11. The civil wars in Sudan and Ethiopia have been going on for over two decades. Yet, the 
OAU has not made any pronouncements on them. 
12. Fasehun and Sesay, "The OAU and Conflict Control." 
13. Ibid., p. 13. 
14. Ibid., p. 13. 
15. For more on this and other related concepts, see Amadu Sesay, "The roles of the Front Line 
States in Southern Africa," in Olajide Aluko and Tim Shaw, eds., Southern Africa in the 
1980s (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985), Chapter 2. See also Inis Claude, The Changing 
United Nations (New York: Random House, 1967). 
16. West Africa (London), 7 July 1980, p. 1217. 
17. The members were Nigeria, Niger, Sudan, Central African Republic, Cameroun, Togo, 
Guinea, Benin, Congo, Sierra Leone, Senegal, and Liberia. 
18. Africa Research Bulletin (henceforth ARB), 1 -31 December 1980, p. 5909. 
19. See United Nations, The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-Keeping (New York: UN 
Department of Public Information, 1985). 
20. Alan James, Politics of Peace-Keeping, p. 2. 
21. For more details on modes of conflict management, see Amadu Sesay et al., The OAU 
After Twenty Years, Chapter 3. 
22. ARB, 1-31 January 1981, p. 5930. 
23. For more on this, see David S. Yost, "French Policy in Chad and the Libyan Challenge," 
Orbis 26, no. 4 (Winter 1983), pp. 965-997; and Pierre Lellouche and Dominique Moisi, 
"French Policy in Africa: A lonely battle against destabilization," International Security, 
3, no. 4 (Spring 1979), pp. 108-133. 
24. The arms included 20 M60 tanks, 12155 mm howitzers and 2 F5 fighters; the package was 
estimated at $100M. Sec ARB 1-31 October 1981, p. 6210. 
25. ARB, 1-31 October 1981, p. 6211. 
26. Ibid., 1-30 June 1981, p. 6068. 
27. Ibid., 1-31 December 1981, p. 6274. 
28. Quoted in Punch, (Lagos), 6 December 1981. See also, Olusola Ojo and Amadu Sesay, 
"The OAU Peace-Keeping Force in Chad: An Analysis of Policy Implementation and 
Failure," in C.A.B. Olowu and Victor Ayeni, eds., A Nigerian Reader in the Policy 
Process (Ife: University of Ife Press, forthcoming), pp. 1-18. 
29. Ojo and. Sesay, "The OAU Peace-Keeping Force in Chad," p. 9. 
30. Alan James, The Politics of Peace-Keeping, p. 12. 
31. For more on this, see Sesay et al., The OAU After Twenty Years. 
32. ARB, 1-28 February 1982, p. 6355. 
33. OAU's Secretary-General, Ide Oumarou, quoted in West Africa, 16 March 1987, p. 541. 
34. While the budget was $23.2M in that year, arrears were $35M. See Guardian (Lagos), 26 
January 1988. 
35. According to Amate, by 31 August 1982, only $5.4M had been contributed for the Force. 
See Amate, Inside the OAU, p. 457. 
24 
Conflict Quarterly 
36. See West Africa, 9-15 January 1989, p. 14. 
37. However, no figure is available on how much the fund was able to realize, or what was 
to be done precisely with the money collected. 
38. It was believed that apart from the financial limitations, Guinea's President Toure was also 
of the view that his country could not participate because the OAU was being teleguided 
by France. In the case of Togo, Weddeye objected to the country ' s contingent because he 
thought Eyadema was politically biased. 
39. It was claimed in Lagos that by May 1982, the Nigerian government had spent $43M on 
its troops in Chad. 
40. The UN conservatively spent $416M in Namibia to maintain the troops during the 
transition. Guardian (Lagos), 24 January 1988. 
41. For the experience, see "Oil Debts and Democracy: Nigeria," Review of African Political 
Economy, 37 (December 1986). The entire number is devoted to Nigeria. There were riots 
in Nigeria in April 1988, overthe removal ofapetroleum subsidy. Some lives were lost. 
Before then, there were food riots in Zambia, Morocco, and Algeria. 
42. Arrears to the annual budget stood at $35M in 1988, more than that year's budget. See 
Guardian (Lagos), 26 February 1988. 
43. In late 1988, following the internal strife in Rwanda, the government decided to give more 
cabinet posts to the majority Hutus to pacify them. See also the MPLA-UNITA Accord 
of 22 June 1989. 
44. See advert in West Africa, 15 June 1988. The emoluments are slowly being improved. 
45. Chapter XV, Article 101(3) of the UN Charter. See also Amadu Sesay, "The global 
economic squeeze and the administration of international organisation: the African 
experience," (Ife: Faculty of Administration, Obafemi Awolowo University, 1986), 
Chapter 1. 
46. See The Military Balance (London: JJSS, 1988) for details. 
47. Britain, France and the US offered assistance with 21 Landrovers, boots, badges, aspirin, 
etc. See Amate, Inside the OAU, p. 458, and ARB, 1-31 December 1981, p. 6275. 
48. Lt. Col. R.M. Kupolati of Nigeria who was a member of the Force, in R.M. Kupolati, 
"OAU Force in Chad: Nigerian Experience and Lessons Learned," (Lagos) no date, page 
4, quoted in Ojo and Sesay, T h e OAU Peace-Keeping Forces in Chad." Commissioned 
Chapter, yet unpublished; 18 pages. 
49. Ojo and Sesay, "The OAU Peace-Keeping Force in Chad," p. 9. 
50. Amadu Sesay, "The global economic squeeze and the administration of international 
organisation." 
51. Lt Col. Kupolati, "OAU Force in Chad," in Ojo and Sesay, "The OAU Peace-Keeping 
Force in Chad," p. 4. 
52. ARB, 1-30 November 1981, p. 6251. 
53. West Africa, 3 May 1982, p. 1436. See also David S. Yost, "French Policy in Chad." He 
quoted Weddeye as saying, "the Chadian government thinks it is vain to continue to 
support and keep such a force on its national territory, since it does nothing to safeguard 
the security and integrity of Chad—it has been passive and therefore useless," p. 981. 
54. ARB, 1-28 February 1982, p. 6335. 
55. Daily Nation (Nairobi), 24 May 1982. 
56. ARB, 1-28 February 1982, p. 6335. 
57. 24 November 1982. 
58. Lack of a central command made it possible for the Zairean troops to establish links with 
Habre's force. See note 2 above. 
25 
Winter 1991 
59. Apart from a force of 4,600 the UN also had several hundred civilian administrators in 
Namibia for the transitional programme. See Guardian (Lagos), 24 January 1988. 
60. See Amate, Inside the OAU, p. 458. 
61. See for example, the ECOMOG forces sent to Liberia by the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) in August 1990. 
62. Note the refusal by France and Belgium to allow their troops to intervene in the civil war 
in Rwanda in October 1990. 
63. A detailed discussion on all the suggested reforms is beyond the scope of this paper. 
However, see Comments on the Committee of Experts' Proposal for the Review of OAU 
Charter: Report of Rapporteur. Ref. CAB/LEG/97.1 (Lagos). 
64. See Comments on the Committee. See also E.F. Udoyeop, "The Organisation of African 
Unity: A Case for the Review ofthe Charter," Msc. Project, 1985, Dept. of International 
Relations, University of Ife, especially chapter HI. 
65. Lonrho was chosen by the Secretary-General as the consultant to African states on oil 
matters, in spite ofthe company's many business interests in South Africa and Rhodesia 
(Zimbabwe). 
66. For his own defence, see Memorandum on the Admission ofthe Saharaoui Arab Demo-
cratic Republic into the OAU (Addis Ababa: OAU Secretariat, 1982). 
67. For the social impact of these programmes, see West Africa (London), 17-23 October 
1988, pp. 1942,1943 and 1932. See also Jeff Haynes, Trevor W. Parfitt and Steve Riley, 
"Debt in Sub-Saharan Africa: die local politics of stabilization," African Affairs 86, no. 
344 (1987), pp. 343-66; and, Trevor W. Parfitt and Steve Riley, "African Debt and Debate 
on stabilisation: The Case of Nigeria," in Geo Forum 19, no. 1 (1988). 
68. The OAU occasionally holds pledging conferences in aid of African refugees. The 
SADCC countries have also held pledging conferences to raise money for specific 
projects in the Sub-region. These conferences have not however, yielded much in the past. 
See also Amadu Sesay, "The OAU and Continental Order," in Tim Shaw and Olusola Ojo, 
eds., Africa and the International Political System (Washington, DC: UPA, 1982), 
Chapter 7. 
26 
